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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a reliable solution to communication problems that re-
quire long-term data security. For its widespread use, however, the rate and reach of QKD systems
must be improved. Twin-field (TF) QKD is a step forward toward this direction, with early demon-
strations suggesting it can beat the current rate-versus-distance records. A recently introduced
variant of TF-QKD is particularly suited for experimental implementation, and has been shown
to offer a higher key rate than other variants in the asymptotic regime where users exchange an
infinite number of signals. Here, we extend the security of this protocol to the finite-key regime,
showing that it can overcome the fundamental bounds on point-to-point QKD with around 1010
transmitted signals. Within distance regimes of interest, our analysis offers higher key rates than
those of alternative variants. Moreover, some of the techniques we develop are applicable to the
finite-key analysis of other QKD protocols.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties, Alice and Bob, to generate a shared secret key in
the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who may have unbounded computational power at her disposal [1, 2]. While,
ideally, the two parties can be at any distance, in practice, due to the loss and noise in the channel, point-to-point
QKD is limited to a certain maximum distance at which secret key bits can securely be exchanged. In fact, the longest
distance achieved to date in a terrestrial QKD experiment is about 400 km [3, 4]. The main limitation is the exponential
decrease of the transmittance, η, with the channel length in optical fibres. Even with a high repetition rate of 10 GHz,
it would take an average of about two minutes to send a single photon over a distance of 600 km of standard optical
fibres, and about 300 years to send it over 1000 km [5]. Indeed, fundamental bounds [6, 7] on the private capacity of
repeaterless point-to-point QKD protocols show that their secret-key rate scales at best approximately linearly with
η. A protocol that aims to overcome this linear scaling must then include at least one middle node. Interestingly, this
is not a sufficient condition. A well-known counterexample is the so-called measurement-device independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) [8], which uses the middle node for an untrusted Bell-state measurement operation. There are, however,
extensions of MDI-QKD that can improve its rate scaling from η to
√
η by either using quantum memories [9, 10] or
quantum non-demolition measurements [11]. Such setups can, in fact, be considered to be the simplest examples of
quantum repeaters [5, 12], which are the ultimate solution to trust-free long-distance quantum communications [13].
However, even these simple versions may need more time to efficiently be implemented in practice [14, 15].
Remarkably, the recently proposed twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [16] can also overcome this linear scaling while using
a relatively simple setup. TF-QKD is related to MDI-QKD, and it inherits its immunity to detector side-channels.
However, it relies on single-photon, rather than two-photon, interference for its entanglement swapping operation. The
secret-key rate of this protocol was first conjectured [16] and then proven [17, 18] to scale with
√
η too, making this
approach a strong candidate to beat the current QKD records [19–22] with today’s technology. The main experimental
challenge is that single-photon interference needs very precise phase stability, which makes it more demanding than
two-photon interference. Also, some of its current security proofs [17, 18] need Alice and Bob to randomly choose
a global phase, and then post-select only those rounds in which their choices match, which causes a drop in the
secret key rate. Since the original proposal, several variants of TF-QKD have been developed [23–26], sharing the
single-photon interference idea and its consequent
√
η scaling, but differing in their experimental setups and security
proofs. Moreover, some of these variants have been shown to be robust against phase misalignment [24–26], which
simplifies their experimental implementation.
In this paper, we focus on the TF-QKD variant introduced in [24], which has two key features: (i) it does not
need phase post-selection, which results in a higher secret-key rate; and (ii) it is a convenient option for experimental
implementation. Indeed, most of the current TF-QKD experiments use this variant [19, 20, 22]. One of its defining
characteristics is its unconventional security proof; specifically, its estimation of the phase-error rate of the protocol, a
parameter needed to bound the amount of key information that may have leaked to an eavesdropper. In many QKD
protocols, the phase-error rate of the single-photon emissions in one basis can be directly estimated by bounding the
bit-error rate of the single-photon emissions in the other basis. In the above TF-QKD variant, however, the encoding
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2bases are not mutually unbiased. To estimate the phase error rate, the authors in [24] use the complementarity [27]
between the “phase” and the “photon-number” of a bosonic mode. In this case, the security of a bit encoded in
the relative phase of two coherent pulses can be related to the detection statistics of photon-number states. More
specifically, in the asymptotic regime, the phase-error rate can be bounded by a non-linear function of infinitely many
yield probabilities for even photon-number states [24], which can be estimated via the decoy-state method [28–30].
While, in the asymptotic regime, the protocol in [24] offers a higher key rate than its counterparts, it is not obvious
if this advantage will still hold in a practical setting where only a finite number of pulses is sent. In the finite-key
regime, one should account for possible statistical fluctuations between the true phase-error rate and the measurement
data used to estimate it. There are, however, two challenges in doing so. The first challenge is that the phase-error
rate of the protocol is related to the measurement statistics of infinitely many combinations of photon-number states;
in practice, one can only obtain bounds for a finite number of them, and dealing with the unbounded components is
not as straightforward as in the asymptotic regime. The second challenge is that, unlike in many other QKD protocols,
the encoding bases are not mutually unbiased. This opens the possibility that, under a coherent attack by Eve, the
detection statistics of a particular round may depend on the basis choices made in previous rounds. Accounting for
these correlations makes the analysis quite cumbersome.
In this work, we provide a rigorous security proof for the protocol in [24] that accounts for these two issues in the
finite-key setting. Our security proof provides a tight bound on the key rate against general coherent attacks. To
overcome the two main challenges mentioned above, we borrow ideas from the finite-key analysis of MDI-QKD [31]
and the loss-tolerant protocol [32, 33]. In addition, we introduce new methods to deal with the particularities of the
protocol. In particular, we develop a novel technique to bound the deviation between the sum of correlated Bernoulli
random variables and its expected value, which can be much tighter than the widely employed Azuma’s inequality
when the success probability is low. We remark that this procedure could be employed to obtain tighter bounds in
QKD security analyses in which Azuma’s inequality is typically used, such as those considering intensity fluctuations
[34] or other source imperfections [33, 35–37]. Importantly, our numerical simulations show that the protocol can
overcome the repeaterless bounds [6, 7] for a block size of only 1010 transmitted signals in nominal working conditions.
During the preparation of this manuscript, an alternative finite-key security analysis for an identical protocol setup
has been reported in [38], using an interesting, but different, approach. We would like to highlight that, under
identical channel conditions, our analysis results in a higher secret-key rate and imposes fewer conditions on the setup
parameters than that of Ref. [38]. In the Discussion section, we compare both approaches. We also compare our
results with those of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol introduced in [26], whose security has recently
been extended to the finite-key regime [39]. We find that for reasonably large block sizes, the asymptotic key rate
advantage of the scheme in [24] is maintained in the finite-key regime, for most practical ranges of distance.
RESULTS
Protocol description
The setup of the TF-QKD protocol in [24] is illustrated in Fig. 1 and its step-by-step description is given in Box 1.
Alice and Bob generate quantum signals and send them to a middle node, Charlie, who would ideally couple them at
a balanced 50:50 beamsplitter and perform a photodetection measurement. For simplicity, we assume the symmetric
scenario in which the Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie quantum channels are identical. We note, however, that our
analysis can be straightforwardly extended to the asymmetric scenario recently considered in [40, 41]. The emitted
quantum signals belong to two bases, selected at random. In the X basis, Alice and Bob send phase-locked coherent
states |±α〉 with a random phase of either 0 or pi with respect to a pre-agreed reference. In the Z basis, Alice and
Bob generate phase-randomised coherent states (PRCSs), which are diagonal in the Fock basis. The X-basis states
are used to generate the key, while the Z-basis data is used to estimate the detection statistics of Fock states, in
combination with the decoy-state method. This is a crucial step in estimating the phase-error rate of the key, thus
bounding the information that could have been leaked to a potential eavesdropper.
Box 1: Simple TF-QKD protocol
(1) Preparation
Alice (Bob) chooses the key-generation basis X with probability pX and the parameter estimation basis Z with probability
pZ = 1− pX , and
(1.1) If she (he) chooses the X basis, she (he) generates a random bit bA (bB), prepares an optical pulse in the coherent
state
∣∣(−1)bAα〉 (∣∣(−1)bBα〉), and sends it to Charlie.
3Figure 1. Setup for the TF-QKD protocol [24] described in Box 1. Alice and Bob generate their raw key from the rounds
in which they both select the X basis and Charlie declares that a single detector has clicked. The key bit is encoded in the
phase of their coherent state. When the users select the same (a different) bit, the constructive (destructive) at Charlie’s
50:50 beamsplitter interference should cause a click in detector Dc (Dd). The Z-basis PRCSs are only used to estimate the
phase-error rate of the X-basis emissions.
(1.2) If she (he) chooses the Z basis, she (he) sends an optical pulse in a PRCS of intensity µ, selected from the set
µ = {µ0, µ1, . . . , µd−1} with probability pµ, where d is the number of decoy intensities used.
They repeat step (1) for N rounds.
(2) Detection
An honest Charlie measures each round separately by interfering Alice and Bob’s signals at a 50:50 beamsplitter, followed
by threshold detectors Dc and Dd on its output ports, and reports the pair (kc, kd), where kc = 1 (kd = 1) if detector
Dc (Dd) clicks and kc = 0 (kd = 0) otherwise. If he is dishonest, Charlie can measure all rounds coherently using an
arbitrary quantum measurement, and report N pairs (kc, kd) depending on the result. A round is considered successful
(unsuccessful) if kc 6= kd (kc = kd).
(3) Sifting
For all successful rounds, Alice and Bob disclose their basis choices, keeping only those in which they have used the same
basis. LetMX (MZ) be the set of successful rounds in which both users employed the X (Z) basis, and let MX = |MX |
(MZ = |MZ |) be the size of this set. Alice and Bob disclose their intensity choices for the rounds in MZ and learn the
number of rounds Mµν inMZ in which they selected intensities µ ∈ µ and ν ∈ µ, respectively. Also, they generate their
sifted keys from the values of bA and bB corresponding to the rounds in MX . For those rounds in which kc = 0 and
kd = 1, Bob flips his sifted key bit.
(4) Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob apply the decoy-state method to Mµν , for µ, ν ∈ µ, obtaining upper-bounds MUnm on the number of rounds
Mnm in MZ in which they sent n and m photons, respectively. They do this for all non-negative n,m ≥ 0 such that
n+m is even and n+m ≤ Scut for a prefixed parameter Scut. Then, they use this data to obtain an upper bound NUph
on the number of phase errors, Nph, in their sifted keys, and check if the upper bound e
U
ph = N
U
ph/MX is lower than a
predetermined threshold value. If so, they continue to the last step; otherwise they abort the protocol.
(5) Postprocessing
(5.1) Error correction: Alice sends Bob a pre-fixed amount λEC of syndrome information bits through an authenticated
public channel, which Bob uses to correct errors in his sifted key.
(5.2) Error verification: Alice and Bob compute a hash of their error-corrected keys using a random universal hash
function, and check whether they are equal. If so, they continue to the next step; otherwise, they abort the
protocol.
(5.3) Privacy amplification Alice and Bob extract a secret key pair (SA, SB) of length |SA| = |SB | = ` from their
error-corrected keys by using a random two-universal hash function.
Parameter estimation and Secret-key rate analysis
The main contribution of this work—see Methods for the details—is a procedure to obtain a tight upper-bound
NUph on the total number of phase errors Nph in the finite-key regime for the protocol described in Box 1. Namely, we
4find that except for an arbitrarily small failure probability ε, it holds that
Nph ≤ NUph :=
p2X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m≤Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
√
MUnm + ∆nm +
√
MZ + ∆
∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m>Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
]2
+ ∆, (1)
where pnm|X (pnm|Z) is the probability that Alice and Bob’s joint X (Z) basis pulses contain n and m photons,
respectively, given by
pnm|X = |〈α|n〉|2|〈α|m〉|2, (2)
pnm|Z = pn|Zpm|Z =
∑
µ,ν
pµpνpn|µpm|ν , (3)
with pn|µ = µn exp(−µ)/n! being the Poisson probability that a PRCS pulse of intensity µ will contain n photons; ∆
and ∆nm are statistical fluctuation terms defined in step 4 of Box 2; N0 (N1) is the set of non-negative even (odd)
integers; and the rest of the parameters have been introduced in Box 1. The phase-error rate is then simply upper-
bounded by eUph := N
U
ph/MX . Box 2 provides a step-by-step instruction list to apply our results to the measurement
data obtained in an experimental setup.
When it comes to finite-key analysis, there is one key difference between the protocol in Box 1 and several other
protocols, such as, for example, decoy-state BB84 [42], decoy-state MDI-QKD [31], and sending-or-not-sending TF-
QKD [39]. In all the latter setups, when there are no state-preparation flaws, the single-photon components of the two
encoding bases are mutually unbiased; in other words, they look identical to Eve once averaged by the bit selection
probabilities. This implies that such states could have been generated from a maximally entangled bipartite state,
where one of its components is measured in one of the two orthogonal bases, and the other half represents an encoded
key bit. In fact, the user(s) could even wait until they learn which rounds have been successfully detected to decide
their measurement basis, effectively delaying their choice of encoding basis. This possibility allows the application
of a random sampling argument: since the choice of the encoding basis is independent of Eve’s attack, the bit error
rate of the successful X-basis emissions provides a random sample of the phase-error rate of the successful Z-basis
emissions, and vice-versa. Then, one can apply tight statistical results such as the Serfling inequality [43] to bound
the phase-error rate in one basis using the measured bit-error rate in the other basis. This approach, however, is not
directly applicable to the protocol in Box 1, in which the secret key is extracted from all successfully detected X-basis
signals, not just from their single-photon components. Moreover, the encoding bases are not mutually unbiased: the
Z-basis states are diagonal in the Fock basis, while the X-basis states are not. This will require a different, perhaps
more cumbersome, analysis as we highlight below.
To estimate the X-basis phase-error rate from the Z-basis measurement data, we construct a virtual protocol (see
Box 3) in which the users learn their basis choice by measuring a quantum coin after Charlie/Eve reveals which rounds
were successful. Note that, because of the biased basis feature of the protocol, the statistics of the quantum coins
associated to the successful rounds could depend on Eve’s attack. This means that the users cannot delay their choice
of basis, which prevents us from applying the random sampling argument. Still, it turns out that the quantum coin
technique now allows us to upper-bound the average number of successful rounds in which the users had selected the
X basis and undergone a phase error. This bound is a non-linear function of the average number of successful rounds
in which they had selected the Z basis and respectively sent n and m photons, with n+m even. More details can be
found in the Methods Section; see Eq. (20).
The main tool we use to relate each of the above average terms to their actual occurrences, Nph and Mnm, is a
refined version of Azuma’s inequality [44, 45]. Azuma’s inequality [46] is widely used in security analyses of QKD to
bound sums of observables over a set of rounds of the protocol (in our case, the set of successful rounds after sifting),
when the independence between the observables corresponding to different rounds cannot be guaranteed. For both
Azuma’s inequality and its refined version, the deviation term ∆ scales with the square root of the number of terms in
the sum. In our case, ∆ scales with
√
Ms, where Ms is the number of successful rounds after sifting. For parameters
of comparable magnitude to Ms, this provides us with a reasonably tight bound. Whenever the parameter of interest
is small, however, the provided bound could instead be loose. This is the case for the crucial term MU00 in Eq. (1), as
vacuum states are unlikely to result in successful detection events, thus the bound obtained with Azuma’s inequality
can be loose. This is important because, in Eq. (1), the coefficient associated to the vacuum term is typically the
largest. It is then essential to find a tighter bound for this term.
One key contribution of this work is a novel technique to bound the deviation between the sum of dependent
Bernoulli random variables and its expected value. The technique is based on an iterative application of a concentration
bound for supermartingales [47] (see Supplementary Note A), and it provides a much tighter bound than Azuma’s
5inequality when either the value of the sum or its expected value is much lower than the number of terms in the
sum. In particular, it provides a tight upper-bound for the vacuum component M00. In each iteration, the deviation
term scales with the square root of the sum of M00 and the deviation term corresponding to the previous iteration
(except for an additive overhead), which effectively enables us to achieve a deviation term which scales with
√
M00,
see Eq. (6). This scaling behaviour is comparable with that of the Chernoff bound for sums of independent random
variables [48]. That is, with this technique, we can mitigate the effects of correlations between different rounds of the
protocol on the tightness of our analysis. This technique may replace Azuma’s inequality in other scenarios in which
such correlations exist. Examples include the case of imperfect sources [33], sources that suffer from information
leakage [35–37], or, in general, any scenario in which a lack of bias between the encoding bases cannot be guaranteed.
We remark that every iteration has an associated failure probability, which adds to the total failure probability of
the estimation process. There is then an optimal number of iterations, after which the decrease in the deviation term
does not justify the increase in the failure rate. In our case, we find that four iterations are sufficient for our numerical
purposes; see Box 2 and Supplementary Note A for further details.
Having obtained eUph, we show in Supplementary Note B that the secret-key length, `, can be lower bounded by
` ≥MX
[
1− h(eUph)
]− λEC − log2 2c − log2 142PA , (4)
while guaranteeing that the protocol is c-correct and s-secret, with s = 2ε + PA; where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x) is the Shannon binary entropy function, λEC is number of bits that are spent in the error-correction
procedure, PA is the failure probability of the privacy amplification scheme, and ε is the failure probability associated
to the estimation of the phase error rate. Here, our security analysis follows the universal composable security
framework [49, 50], according to which a protocol is sec-secure if it is both c-correct and s-secret, with sec ≥ c + s.
The correctness criterion is met when Alice and Bob’s secret keys SA and SB are identical, and the protocol is c-
correct when Pr[SA 6= SB ] ≤ c. The secrecy criterion is met when the classical-quantum state ρAE describing Alice’s
secret key and Eve’s side information is of the form ρAE = UA⊗ ρE , where UA is the uniform distribution over all bit
strings, and ρE is an arbitrary quantum state. The protocol is s-secret if
1
2
‖ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE‖ ≤ s, (5)
where ‖·‖ is the trace norm.
Box 2: Instructions for experimentalists
1. Run steps 1-3 of the protocol in Box 1, obtaining a sifted key of length MX , and Z-basis measurement counts M
µν for
µ, ν ∈ µ. Let Ms = MX +MZ be the number of successful rounds after sifting.
2. Set the security parameters c and PA, as well as the failure probabilities εc and εa for the inverse multiplicative Chernoff
bound and the refined Azuma’s inequality, respectively. Calculate the overall failure probability ε of the parameter
estimation process, which depends on the number of times that the previous two inequalities are applied. In general,
ε = d2εc +
(bScut
2
c+ 1)2 εa + 4εa, where d is the number of decoy intensities employed by each user, and the last term
of 4εa comes from the number of iterations used in step 4. For Scut = 4 and three decoy intensities, we have that
ε = 9εc + 13εa.
3. Use the analytical decoy-state method included in the Supplementary Note C to obtain upper bounds MUnm from M
µν .
Alternatively, use the numerical estimation method introduced in the Supplementary Notes of [31].
4. Set ∆ = 5
4
√
2
√
Ms ln ε
−1
a and ∆nm = ∆ for all n,m except for m = n = 0. Set ∆
(1) = ∆ and define the recursive function
∆(i+1) =
1
3
(
ln ε−1a +
√
18 (MU00 + ∆
(i)) ln ε−1a + ln2 εa
)
. (6)
Set ∆00 = ∆
(4).
5. Use Eq. (1) to find NUph and set e
U
ph = N
U
ph/MX .
6. Use Eq. (4) to specify the required amount of privacy amplification and to find the corresponding length of the secret
key that can be extracted. The key obtained is sec-secure, with sec ≥ c + s and s = 2ε+ PA.
6DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyse the behaviour of the secret-key rate as a function of the total loss. We simulate the
nominal no-Eve scenario with an honest Charlie. In this case, the total Alice-Bob loss includes the loss in the quantum
channels as well as that of Charlie’s detectors. We compare the key rate for the protocol in Box 1, using the finite-
key security analysis introduced in the previous section, with that of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol
[26, 39], as well as with the finite-key analysis presented in Ref. [38]. In all cases, we use the simple channel model
described in Supplementary Note D, which accounts for phase and polarisation misalignments. Also, we assume that
both users employ three decoy-state intensities µ0 > µ1 > µ2. Since the optimal value µ2 = 0 is typically difficult to
achieve in practice, we set µ2 = 10
−4 and optimise the secret-key rate over the value of µ0 and µ1. We also optimise
it over the selection probabilities, as well as over pX and α.
pd δph δpol f c s
10−8 9.1% 0 1.16 10−10 10−10
Table I. List of parameters used in the numerical simulations. Here, pd is the dark count probability, per pulse, of the detectors,
δph is the phase misalignment of the system, δpol is the polarisation misalignment of the system, and f is the error-correction
inefficiency. In our numerical simulations, we set ε = PA = s/3.
The nominal values for system parameters are summarised in Table I. We assume a phase mismatch of 9.1% between
Alice and Bob’s signals, corresponding to a QBER of around 2% for most attenuations, matching the experimental
results in [19]. For brevity, we do not consider the effect of polarisation misalignment in our numerical results, but one
can use the provided analytical model to study different scenarios of interest. In principle, even if the mechanism used
for polarisation stability is not perfect, one can use polarisation filters to ensure that the same polarisation modes are
being coupled at the 50:50 beamsplitter, at the cost of introducing additional loss. We assume an error correction
leakage of λEC = fMXh(eX), where eX is the bit error rate of the sifted key, and f is the error correction inefficiency.
For the security bounds, we set c = s = 10
−10, and for simplicity we set ε = PA = s/3.
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Figure 2. Secret key rate per pulse for the protocol in Box 1 for different values of the block size, N , which represents the total
number of rounds in the protocol. The overall Alice-Bob loss, 1/η, includes the loss in the quantum channels and Charlie’s
detectors. The repeaterless bound is given by − log2(1− η) [7]. The simulation parameters are listed in Table I.
In Fig. 2, we display the secret key rate per pulse for the protocol in Box 1 for different values of the block size, N ,
of transmitted signals. It can be seen that the protocol can outperform the repeaterless bound for a block size of just
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Figure 3. Secret key rate per pulse for the protocol in Box 1 at a total loss of 50 dB, for different values of phase misalignment,
as a function of the block size N . All other simulation parameters are listed in Table I.
1010 transmitted signals per user, at an approximate total loss of 50 dB. For standard optical fibres, this corresponds
to a total distance of 250 km, if we neglect the loss in the photodetectors. At a 1 GHz clock rate, it takes only ten
seconds to collect the required data. For a block size of 1011 transmitted signals, the protocol can already outperform
the repeaterless bound for a total loss ranging from 45 dB to over 80 dB. By increasing N , we approach the asymptotic
performance of the protocol.
The dependence of the secret key rate on the block size N has been shown in Fig. 3, at a fixed total loss of 50 dB
and for several values of phase misalignment. In all cases, there is a minimum required block size to obtain a positive
key rate. This minimum block size can be even lower than 109 in the ideal case of no phase misalignment, and it goes
up to around 1010 at δph = 20%. There is a sharp increase in the secret key rate once one goes over this minimum
required block size after which one slowly approaches the key rate in the asymptotic limit. The latter behaviour is
likely due to the use of Azuma’s inequality. One can, nevertheless, overcome the repeaterless bound at a reasonable
block size in a practical regime where δph ≤ 15%. At higher values of total loss this crossover happens at even larger
values of δph.
In Fig. 4, we compare the performance of the protocol in Box 1 with that of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD
protocol presented in [26, 39]. In the asymptotic regime, the former protocol outperforms the latter at all values of
total loss. For a block size of 1012 transmitted signals, this is still the case up to 80 dB of total loss, after which
the key rate is perhaps too low to be of practical relevance. For a block size of 1010 transmitted signals, however,
the curves for the two protocols cross at around 55 dB, where they happen to cross the repeaterless bound as well.
In this case, the sending-or-not-sending protocol offers a better performance after this point. This behaviour is due
to the different statistical fluctuation analyses applied to the two protocols. As explained in the Result section, the
single-photon components in the sending-or-not-sending protocol are mutually unbiased, allowing for a simpler and
tighter estimation of the phase-error rate. This is not the case for the TF-QKD protocol in Box 1, for which this
estimation involves the application of somewhat looser bounds for several terms in Eq. (1). We conclude that for
sufficiently large block sizes, the protocol in Box 1 maintains its better performance over the sending-or-not sending
variant.
Finally, in Fig. 5, we compare our results with those of the alternative analysis in [38]. To compute the secret-key
rate of the latter, we use the code provided by the authors, except for the adjustments needed to match it to the
channel model described in Supplementary Note D. It can be seen that, at all cases considered and for most practical
regimes of interest, the analysis introduced in this paper provides a higher key rate than that of [38]. Moreover, we
remark that the security proof presented in [38], in its current form, is only applicable when the state generated by
the weakest decoy intensity µ2 is a perfect vacuum state of intensity µ2 = 0. The security analysis presented in this
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Figure 4. Comparison between this work and sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD[26, 39], for different block size values N of
transmitted signals. All other simulation parameters are listed in Table I.
work, however, can be applied to any experimental value of µ2, and we assume a value of µ2 = 10
−4, which may be
easier to achieve in practice. That said, the security proof in [38] adopts an interesting approach that results in a
somehow simpler statistical analysis. In particular, unlike in the analysis presented in this paper, the authors in [38]
do not estimate the detection statistics of photon-number states as an intermediate step to bounding the phase-error
rate. Instead, they show that the operator corresponding to a phase-error can be bounded by a linear combination
of the Z-basis decoy states. While this linear bound is asymptotically looser than the non-linear formula in Eq. (1),
it allows the application of a simpler statistical analysis based on a double use of Bernoulli sampling. Given that the
finite-key analysis of a protocol could be part of the software package of a product, we believe that the additional key
rate achievable by our analysis justifies its slightly more complex approach.
In conclusion, we have proven the security of the protocol in Box 1 in the finite-key regime scenario against coherent
attacks. Our results show that, under nominal working conditions experimentally achievable by today’s technology,
this scheme could outperform the repeaterless secret-key rate bound in a key exchange run of only ten seconds,
assuming a 1 GHz clock rate. It would also outperform other TF-QKD variants, as well as alternative security proofs
in practical regimes of interest. Some of the techniques developed in this work could be used to improve the achievable
secret-key rate in other scenarios in which Azuma’s inequality is typically used.
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Figure 5. Comparison between this work and the alternative analysis in [38], for different block size values N of transmitted
signals. The simulation parameters are listed in Table I.
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METHODS
In this section, we introduce the procedure that we use to bound the phase-error rate of the protocol in Box 1,
referring to the Supplementary Notes when appropriate. For notation clarity, we assume the symmetric scenario in
which Alice and Bob employ the same X-basis amplitude α and the same Z-basis intensities µ ∈ µ. However, the
analysis can be applied as well to the asymmetric scenario [40, 41] by appropriately redefining the parameters pnm|X
and pnm|Z .
Virtual protocol
To bound the phase-error rate, we construct a virtual protocol in which Alice and Bob measure an observable that
is conjugate to that used to generate the key. By the complementarity argument [27], the bit-error rate of this virtual
protocol is identical to the phase-error rate of the actual protocol, provided that the two protocols are equivalent.
The equivalence condition is satisfied if the two protocols send the same quantum and classical information, thus
Eve cannot tell which of the two is being performed. More concretely, our virtual protocol replaces Alice’s X-basis
emissions by the preparation of the state
|ψx〉Aa =
1√
2
(|+〉A |α〉a + |−〉A |−α〉a), (7)
where A is an ancilla system at Alice’s lab, a is the photonic system sent to Eve, and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉); while Bob’s
X basis emissions are replaced by a similarly defined |ψx〉Bb. After Eve’s attack, Alice and Bob measure systems A
and B in the Z basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, which is conjugate to the X basis {|+〉 , |−〉} that they would use to generate the key.
It is useful to write the state in Eq. (7) as
|ψx〉Aa = |0〉A |C0〉a + |1〉A |C1〉a , (8)
where |C0〉 and |C1〉 are the (unnormalised) cat states
|C0〉 = 1
2
(|α〉+ |−α〉), |C1〉 = 1
2
(|α〉 − |−α〉). (9)
Alice’s Z-basis emissions are diagonal in the Fock basis, and the virtual protocol replaces them by their purification
|ψz〉Aa =
∞∑
n=0
√
pn|Z |n〉A |n〉a , (10)
where pn|Z =
∑
µ∈µ pµpn|µ is the probability that Alice’s Z basis pulse contains n photons, averaged over the selection
of µ. Unlike in the actual protocol, in the virtual protocol Alice and Bob learn the photon number of their signals by
measuring systems A and B after Eve’s attack.
Lastly, Alice’s emission of |ψx〉Aa with probability pX and |ψz〉Aa with probability pZ is replaced by the generation
of the state
|ψ〉AcAa =
√
pX |0〉Ac |ψx〉Aa +
√
pZ |1〉Ac |ψz〉Aa , (11)
where Ac is a quantum coin ancilla at Alice’s lab; while Bob’s is replaced by an equally defined |ψ〉BcBb. Alice and
Bob measure systems Ac and Bc after Eve’s attack, delaying the reveal of their basis choice. The different steps of
the virtual protocol are described in Box 3.
Box 3: Virtual protocol
(1) Preparation
Alice and Bob prepare N copies of the state |φ〉 = |ψ〉AcAa ⊗ |ψ〉BcBb and send all systems a and b to Eve over the
quantum channel.
(2) Detection
Eve performs an arbitrary general measurement on all the subsystems a and b of |φ〉⊗N and publicly announces N bit
pairs (kc, kd). Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between her measurement
outcome and her set of announcements. A round is considered successful (unsuccessful) if kc 6= kd (kc = kd). Let M
(M¯) represent the set of successful (unsuccessful) rounds.
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(3) Virtual sifting
For all rounds, Alice and Bob jointly measure the systems Ac and Bc, learning whether they used the same or different
bases, but not the specific basis they used. Let Ms (Md) denote the set of successful rounds in which they used the
same (different) bases.
(4) Ancilla measurement
(4.1) For all rounds inMs, Alice (Bob) first measures the system Ac (Bc) in {|0〉 , |1〉}, learning her (his) choice of basis.
If the result is |0〉Ac (|0〉Bc), she (he) measures system A (B) in {|0〉 , |1〉}; if the result is |1〉Ac (|1〉Bc), she (he)
measures system A (B) in the Fock basis.
(4.2) For all rounds inMd, Alice (Bob) measures the systems Ac (Bc) and A (B), using the same strategy as in step 4.1.
(5) Intensity assignment
For all rounds inM in which Alice (Bob) obtained |1〉Ac (|1〉Bc), she (he) assigns each n-photon state to intensity µ with
probability pµ|n.
(6) Classical communication
For all rounds in M, Alice and Bob announce all their basis and intensity choices over an authenticated public channel.
(7) Estimation of the number of phase errors
Alice and Bob calculate an upper bound on Nph using their Z basis measurement data.
Two points from the virtual protocol in Box 3 require further explanation. The first is that, in the real protocol,
Bob flips his key bit when Eve reports kc = 0 and kd = 1. This step is omitted from the virtual protocol, since the
X-basis bit flip gate σz has no effect on Bob’s Z-basis measurement result. The second point concerns step 5, which
may appear to serve no purpose, but it is needed to ensure that the classical information exchanged between Alice and
Bob is equivalent to that of the real protocol. The term pµ|n is the probability that Alice’s (Bob’s) Z-basis n-photon
pulse originated from intensity µ, and it is given by
pµ|n =
pµpn|µ∑d−1
i=0 pµipn|µi
. (12)
Phase-error rate estimation
We now turn our attention to Alice and Bob’s measurements in step (4.1) in Box 3. Let u ∈ {1, 2, ...,Ms} index the
rounds in Ms, and let ξu denote the measurement outcome of the u-th round. The possible outcomes are ξu = Xij ,
corresponding to |00〉AcBc |ij〉AB , where i, j ∈ {0, 1}; and ξu = Znm, corresponding to |11〉AcBc |n,m〉AB , where n and
m are any positive integers. Note that the outcomes |10〉AcBc and |01〉AcBc are not possible due to the previous virtual
sifting step. A phase error occurs when ξu ∈ {X00, X11}. In Supplementary Note E, we prove that the probability
to obtain a phase error in the u-th round, conditioned on all previous measurement outcomes in the protocol, is
upper-bounded by
Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|Fu−1) ≤ p
2
X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1)
]2
, (13)
where Fu−1 is the σ-algebra generated by random variables ξ1, ..., ξu−1, N0 (N1) is the set of non-negative even (odd)
numbers, and the probability terms pnm|X and pnm|Z have been defined in Eqs. (2) and (3). In Eq. (13), for notation
clarity, we have omitted the dependence of all probability terms on the outcomes of the measurements performed in
steps (2) and (3) in Box 3.
Now, let M
(l)
nm represent the number of events of the form ξu = Znm observed amongst the first l rounds in Ms,
and let
Y (l)nm := M
(l)
nm −
l∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1) . (14)
The sequence Y
(0)
nm , Y
(1)
nm , ..., Y
(Ms)
nm is a martingale satisfying the conditions of the Supplementary Note A, according
to which
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1) ≤Mnm + ∆nm, (15)
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where Mnm := M
(Ms)
nm . Here, ∆nm is a statistical fluctuation term that depends on the specific method used. For
(n,m) 6= (0, 0), we use the refined Azuma’s inequality [44, 45], for which ∆nm = ∆ = 54√2
√
Ms ln ε
−1
a , with εa being
its failure probability. However, for the vacuum term (n,m) = (0, 0), the number of counts M00 is very small and the
refined Azuma’s inequality turns out to be a loose bound. Instead, we use the alternative recursive method introduced
in Supplementary Note A to find ∆00, which fails with probability 4εa.
Similarly, we define N
(l)
ph as the number of phase errors among the first l trials, and define
Y
(l)
ph := N
(l)
ph −
l∑
u=1
Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|Fu−1) . (16)
The sequence Y
(0)
ph , Y
(1)
ph , ..., Y
(Ms)
ph satisfies the conditions of the refined Azuma’s inequality in Supplementary Note
A, according to which
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|Fu−1) ≥ Nph −∆, (17)
except with probability εa, where Nph := N
(Ms)
ph .
Now we will transform Eq. (13) to apply Eqs. (15) and (17). Let us denote the right-hand side of Eq. (13) as f(~pu),
where ~pu is a vector of probabilities composed of Pr(ξu = Znm|Fu−1) ∀n,m. If we expand the square in f(~pu), we
can see that all addends are positive and proportional to
√
p1p2, where p1 and p2 are elements of ~pu, implying that
f(~pu) is a concave function. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality [51], we have
1
Ms
Ms∑
u=1
f(~pu) ≤ f
(
1
Ms
Ms∑
u=1
~pu
)
. (18)
After taking the average over all rounds Ms on both sides of Eq. (13), applying Eq. (18) on the right-hand side,
and cancelling out the term 1/Ms on both sides of the inequality, we have that
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|Fu−1) ≤ p
2
X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
√√√√pnm|X
pnm|Z
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1)
]2
. (19)
We are now ready to apply Eqs. (15) and (17) to substitute the sums of probabilities by Nph and Mnm. However,
note that Alice and Bob only estimate the value of Mnm for terms of the form n+m ≤ Scut and it is only useful to
substitute Eq. (15) for these terms. With this in mind, we obtain
Nph −∆ ≤ p
2
X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m≤Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
√
Mnm + ∆nm +
∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m>Scut
√√√√pnm|X
pnm|Z
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1)
]2
. (20)
We still need to deal with the sum over the infinitely many remaining terms of the form n+m > Scut. For them,
we apply the following upper bound
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1) ≤
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Z|Fu−1) ≤MZ + ∆, (21)
where ξu = Z denotes that Alice and Bob learn that they have used the Z basis in the uth round in Ms; and MZ
is the number of events of the form ξu = Z obtained by Alice and Bob. In the last step, we have applied Azuma’s
inequality, using an identical argument as that of Eqs. (14)-(17). When we apply Eq. (21) to Eq. (20), we end up
with the term ∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m>Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
√
MZ + ∆ =
√
MZ + ∆
∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m>Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
. (22)
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We can show that Eq. (22) converges to a finite value if
max{µ} > α2. (23)
Substituting Eq. (21) into Eq. (20), and isolating Nph, we finally obtain
Nph ≤ p
2
X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m≤Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
√
Mnm + ∆nm +
√
MZ + ∆
∑
n,m∈Nj
n+m>Scut
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
]2
+ ∆. (24)
The only remaining step is to substitute the real but unknown measurement counts Mnm by their upper-bounds
MUnm, obtained via the decoy-state analysis. After doing so, we obtain Eq. (1). The failure probability ε associated
to the estimation of Nph is upper-bounded by summing the failure probabilities of all concentration inequalities used.
That includes the use of the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound and the refined Azuma’s inequality, which fail,
respectively, with probability εc and εa. For the case of three decoy intensities and Scut = 4, we have ε = 9εc + 13εa.
In our simulations, we set εc = εa for simplicity.
Decoy-state analysis
Since Alice and Bob’s Z-basis emissions are a mixture of Fock states, the measurement counts Mnm have a fixed
value, which is nevertheless unknown to them. Instead, the users have access to the measurement counts Mµν ,
the number of rounds in MZ in which they selected intensities µ and ν, respectively. To bound Mnm, we use the
decoy-state method [28–30]. This technique exploits the fact that Alice and Bob could have run an equivalent virtual
scenario in which they directly send Fock states |n,m〉 with probability pnm|Z . Then, after Eve’s attack, they know
the number Mnm of successful events in which they respectively sent n and m photons, and they assign each of them
to intensities µ and ν with probability
pµν|nm =
pµνpnm|µν
pnm|Z
, (25)
where pµν = pµpν . Each of these assignments can be regarded as an independent Bernoulli random variable, and the
expected number of events Mµν assigned to intensities µ and ν is
E[Mµν ] =
∞∑
n,m=0
pµν|nmMnm. (26)
In the actual protocol, Alice and Bob know the realisations Mµν of these random variables. By using the inverse
multiplicative Chernoff bound [48, 52], stated in Supplementary Note F, they can compute lower and upper bounds
EL[Mµν ] and EU[Mµν ] for E[Mµν ]. These will set constraints on the value of Mnm. For all values of i and j, such
that i+ j ≤ Scut and i+ j is even, an upper bound on Mij can be found by solving the following linear optimisation
problem
maxMij
s.t. ∀a, b EU[Mµν ] ≥
∞∑
n,m=0
pµν|nmMnm,
EL[Mµν ] ≤
∞∑
n,m=0
pµν|nmMnm.
(27)
This problem can be solved numerically using linear programming techniques, as described in the Supplementary
Note 2 of [31]. While accurate, this method can be computationally demanding. For this reason, we have instead
adapted the asymptotic analytical bounds of [40, 53] to the finite-key scenario and used them in our simulations. The
results obtained using these analytical bounds are very close to those achieved by numerically solving Eq. (27). This
analytical method is described in Supplementary Note C.
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Supplementary Note A: Concentration inequalities for sums of correlated random variables
In this Note, we introduce the results that allow us to link the sums of probabilities in Eqs. (15) and (17) with
the corresponding measurement counts. The main tool we use is Azuma’s inequality [46]. More concretely, we use
a refined version [44, 45] of Azuma’s inequality, described in Sec. 1 below, that reduces the deviation terms by 5/8
with respect to the original inequality. In the special case of n = m = 0, however, even this refined version may not
provide us with tight bounds as, under nominal conditions, the chance of getting a click when both Alice and Bob
send vacuum states can be very low. For this reason, we develop an alternative bound, which is tighter than Azuma’s
inequality when the measurement counts are small, and which we apply exclusively to the M00 term. This generic
technique is described in Sec. 2 of this note.
1. Refined Azuma’s inequality
Instead of using the standard Azuma’s inequality [46], we use the refined version in [44, 45]. First, we review the
statement of the inequality, and then explain how we use it in our case.
a. Statement
Let Y0, Y1, ..., Yn be a sequence of random variables, and let Fl be its natural filtration, i.e., the σ-algebra generated
by {Y0, Y1, ..., Yl}. The sequence is a martingale if and only if
E[Yl|Fl−1] = Yl−1. (A1)
From [44, 45], for a martingale satisfying
|Yl − E[Yl|Fl−1]| ≤ 1, (A2)
Var
[
Yl
∣∣Fl−1] ≤ σ2, (A3)
we can apply the refined Azuma’s inequality, according to which
Pr [Yn − Y0 > nδ] ≤ e−nD
(
δ+σ2
1+σ2
∣∣∣∣ σ2
1+σ2
)
,
Pr [Yn − Y0 < −nδ] ≤ e−nD
(
δ+σ2
1+σ2
∣∣∣∣ σ2
1+σ2
)
,
(A4)
where
D (p||q) := p ln
(
p
q
)
+ (1− p) ln
(
1− p
1− q
)
, (A5)
is the Ku¨llback-Leibler distance between the probability distributions Bernoulli(p) and Bernoulli(q). Using Pinkser’s
inequality [44], one can show that
D
(
δ + σ2
1 + σ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ σ21 + σ2
)
≥ 2
(
δ
1 + σ2
)2
, (A6)
and combining it with Eq. (A4), we obtain
Pr [Yn − Y0 > nδ] ≤ e−2n
(
δ
1+σ2
)2
,
Pr [Yn − Y0 < −nδ] ≤ e−2n
(
δ
1+σ2
)2
,
(A7)
From Eq. (A7), it is straightforward to show that
Yn − Y0 ≤ ∆
Yn − Y0 ≥ −∆ (A8)
where each bound fails with a probability of at most εa for
∆ = (1 + σ2)
√
n
2
ln ε−1a . (A9)
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b. Application
Let ξ1, ..., ξn be a sequence of Bernoulli random variables, not necessarily independent; and let Λl =
∑l
u=1 ξu
represent the number of events of the form ξu = 1 observed in the first l trials. Let us define the sequence of random
variables
Yl :=
l∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1)− Λl, (A10)
and Y0 = 0. Note that its natural filtration Fl is generated by the set of events {ξ1, ..., ξl}, since it contains the same
information as the set {Y0, Y1, ..., Yl}. Thus, Eq. (A10) can be equivalently written as
Yl =
l∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1)− Λl. (A11)
This sequence is a martingale, because
E[Yl|Fl−1] = Yl−1 + Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)− E[ξl|Fl−1] = Yl−1. (A12)
Also, we have that
|Yl − Yl−1| = |Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)− ξl| ≤ 1, (A13)
and
Var
[
Yl
∣∣Fl−1] = E [(Yl − E[Yl|Fl−1])2∣∣∣Fl−1]
= E
[
(Yl − Yl−1)2|Fl−1
]
= E
[
(Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)− ξl)2|Fl−1
]
= E
[
Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)2 |Fl−1
]
− 2E [ξl Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1) |Fl−1] + E
[
ξ2l |Fl−1
]
= Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)2 − 2E [ξl|Fl−1] Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1) + E [ξl|Fl−1]
= Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)2 − 2 Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)2 + Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)
= Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)− Pr (ξl = 1|Fl−1)2
≤ 1
4
,
(A14)
where the last inequality results from (x − 1/2)2 ≥ 0, for any real x. Therefore, the sequence Yl given by Eq. (A10)
satisfies the requirements of the refined Azuma’s inequality with σ2 = 1/4, and by Eq. (A8),
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1)− Λn ≤ ∆,
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1)− Λn ≥ −∆,
(A15)
or equivalently
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) ≤ Λn + ∆, (A16)
Λn ≤
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) + ∆, (A17)
where each of the two bounds fails with probability at most εa for
∆ =
5
4
√
2
√
n ln ε−1a . (A18)
As already mentioned, this suggests that the deviation term ∆ is improved by a factor of 5/8 as compared to the
original Azuma’s inequality.
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2. Alternative bound for small measurement counts
The correction term for the refined Azuma’s inequality in Eq. (A18) scales with the square root of the total number
of rounds n. For that reason, it does not provide a tight bound when the counts Λn are small. In this case, the
alternative procedure presented here can offer a tighter bound. The starting point is a concentration inequality that
combines Eqs. (8)-(15) of [47]. Our novel contribution is a recursive application of this result for the special case of
sums of Bernoulli random variables.
a. Concentration bound for martingales [47]
Let Y0, Y1, ..., Yn be a martingale
1 with respect to its natural filtration Fu. Let 〈Y 〉 be the quadratic characteristic
of the martingale, defined as
〈Y 〉0 = 0, 〈Y 〉l =
l∑
u=1
E
[
(Yu − Yu−1)2|Fu−1
]
. (A19)
Assume that Yu − Yu−1 ≤ 1 for all u. Then, for any x ≥ 0 and v > 0, it holds that
Pr
[
Yn > x, 〈Y 〉n ≤ v2
] ≤ exp[− x2
2
(
v2 + 13x
)] . (A20)
b. Recursive application
For the martingale defined in Eq. (A11), we have that
E
[
(Yu − Yu−1)2|Fu−1
]
= Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1)− Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1)2 ≤ Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) , (A21)
where the equality comes from Eq. (A14). Therefore, its quadratic characteristic 〈Y 〉n can be bounded by
〈Y 〉n =
n∑
u=1
E
[
(Yu − Yu−1)2|Fu−1
] ≤ n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) . (A22)
From Eq. (A16), we know that Yn ≤ ∆ except with probability at most εa. That is,
Pr [Yn > ∆] = Pr
[
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) > Λn + ∆
]
≤ εa, (A23)
with ∆ = 5
4
√
2
√
n ln ε−1a . Combining Eqs. (A22) and (A23), we have
Pr [〈Y 〉n > Λn + ∆] ≤ εa. (A24)
Now, we have that
Pr [Yn > x] = Pr [Yn > x, 〈Y 〉n ≤ Λn + ∆] + Pr [Yn > x, 〈Y 〉n > Λn + ∆]
≤ Pr [Yn > x, 〈Y 〉n ≤ Λn + ∆] + Pr [〈Y 〉n > Λn + ∆]
≤ Pr [Yn > x, 〈Y 〉n ≤ Λn + ∆] + εa
≤ exp
[
− x
2
2
(
Λn + ∆ +
1
3x
)]+ εa,
(A25)
1 The result in [47] is for supermartingales, but every martingale is also a supermartingale.
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where in the second inequality we have used Eq. (A24) and in the third we have used Eq. (A20), substituting
v2 = Λn + ∆. Now, we solve the following equation with respect to x
exp
[
− x
2
2
(
Λn + ∆ +
1
3x
)] = εa, (A26)
which has the positive solution
x = ∆(2) :=
1
3
(
ln ε−1a +
√
18(Λn + ∆) ln ε
−1
a + ln
2 εa
)
. (A27)
Therefore, we have that
Pr
[
Yn > ∆
(2)
]
= Pr
[
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) > Λn + ∆(2)
]
≤ 2εa, (A28)
or equivalently
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) ≤ Λn + ∆(2), (A29)
except with probability at most 2εa. As already mentioned, when Λn  n, this bound is much better than the refined
Azuma’s inequality, which scales with
√
n, whereas ∆(2) scales with n1/4.
To conclude, note that we can repeat the same argument as in Eqs. (A21)-(A24) to show that
Pr
[
〈Y 〉n > Λn + ∆(2)
]
≤ 2εa, (A30)
and likewise, show that
Pr
[
Yn > ∆
(3)
]
= Pr
[
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) > Λn + ∆(3)
]
≤ 3εa, (A31)
with
∆(3) =
1
3
(
ln ε−1a +
√
18
(
Λn + ∆(2)
)
ln ε−1a + ln2 εa
)
. (A32)
One can continue with applying this technique iteratively to find even tighter bounds. By every iteration, we reduce
the reliance of the deviation term on n, and will converge to a limit that the effective deviation scales with
√
Λn,
similar to what can be achieved by the Chernoff bounds for sums of independent random variables. Every iteration
would, however, increase the failure probability by a. In our analysis, we use the bound ∆00 := ∆
(4) for the vacuum
component, which fails with probability 4εa. This is because ∆
(4) is already close to the asymptotic limit of infinitely
many iterations.
Supplementary Note B: Security bounds
Let X (X′) denote Alice’s (Bob’s) sifted key of length MX before the post-processing step of the protocol. After
the error correction and verification steps, Bob should have turned X′ into a copy of X. Then, Alice and Bob apply a
privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing to obtain a shorter secret key of length `. The protocol
is s-secret if [54]
s ≤ 2ε+ 1
2
√
2`−Hεmin(X|E′), (B1)
where E′ represents Eve’s total side information about X, and Hεmin(X|E′) is the ε-smooth min entropy of X con-
ditioned on E′. Let E denote Eve’s side information before the error correction step. By the chain rule for smooth
min-entropies [54],
Hεmin(X|E′) ≥ Hεmin(X|E)− λEC − log2
2
c
, (B2)
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where λEC (log2
2
c
) is the number of bits revealed in the error correction (verification) step of the protocol. We now
make use of the following theorem, introduced in [55], which we reproduce here for completeness.
Theorem [55]: Let ε > 0, ρAEB be a tripartite quantum state, X = {Mx} and Z = {Nz} be two POVMs on A,
and X (Z) be the result of the measurement of X (Z). Then,
Hεmin(X|E) +Hεmax(Z|B) ≥ q, (B3)
where q = − log2 1c , with
c = max
x,z
∥∥∥√Mx√Nz∥∥∥2∞. (B4)
To apply this theorem, we consider a slight modification to our virtual protocol in Box 3. In step (4.1), Alice and
Bob now first measure all the basis ancillas Ac and Bc in Ms, keeping only the MX successful rounds in which they
used the X basis, which we denote as the set MX . Let ρAEB be the quantum state that describes all systems A and
B inMX , as well as Eve’s side information E on them. Note that if Alice measures all her systems A in the X basis,
she will obtain a raw key X that is identical to the one she would have obtained in the real protocol; while if she
measures them in the Z basis, she will obtain a raw key Z that is identical to that of the virtual protocol.
Let X = {Mx} (Z = {Nz}) denote Alice’s overall POVM if she chooses to measure all her systems A in the X (Z)
basis. The elements Mx ofX are of the form |x1x2x3...〉〈x1x2x3...|, where xn ∈ {+,−} is the result of the measurement
of round n ∈ {1, ...,MX}. Conversely, the elements Nz of Z are of the form |z1z2z3...〉〈z1z2z3...|, with zn ∈ {0, 1}.
Since Mx and Nz are rank 1 projective measurements, we have that
max
x,z
∥∥∥√MX√Nz∥∥∥2∞ = maxx,z ‖〈x1x2x3...|z1z2z3...〉‖2 = 2−MX , (B5)
where in the last step we have used the fact that ‖〈xn|zn〉‖2 = 1/2, independently of the value of xn and zn. From
Eq. (B3), it follows that
Hεmin(X|E) +Hεmax(Z|B) ≥MX . (B6)
Now, let us assume that Bob measures his systems B using POVM Z, obtaining a string Z′ that is identical to
the one that he would obtain in the virtual protocol. Clearly, the result of a measurement of B cannot contain more
information about Z than system B itself, and therefore
Hεmax(Z|Z′) ≥ Hεmax(Z|B), (B7)
from which we finally obtain
Hεmin(X|E) +Hεmax(Z|Z′) ≥MX . (B8)
In the Methods section, we show that the error rate between Z and Z′ is bounded by eUph, except with a failure
probability ε. Therefore [54],
Hεmax(Z|Z′) ≤MXh(eUph), (B9)
and by combining Eqs. (B2), (B8) and (B9), we have that
Hεmin(X|E′) ≤MX
[
1− h(eUph)
]− λEC − log2 2c . (B10)
By substituting Eq. (B10) and the secret key length ` given in Eq. (4) of the main text into Eq. (B1), we finally
obtain that the protocol is s-secret if we choose s such that
s ≤ 2ε+ PA. (B11)
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Supplementary Note C: Analytical estimation method
In this Note, we present an analytical method to obtain the upper bounds MUnm in Eq. (1), using the observed
quantities Mµν . First, we explain the general idea behind the procedure, and then we obtain specific analytical
bounds for the case of three decoy intensities and Scut = 4, which we use in our simulations. We have numerically
verified that the choice of three decoy intensities is optimal for reasonable block size values below 1012 transmitted
signals.
Our starting point is Eq. (26), which we rewrite as
Mˆµν =
∞∑
n,m=0
µnνm
n!m!pnpm
Mnm, (C1)
by defining Mˆµν = eµ+ν E[M
µν ]
pµpν
. To obtain an upper bound for a specific term Mij in Eq. (C1), we follow a procedure
analogous to Gaussian elimination, defining a linear combination Ωij =
∑
µ,ν cˆµνMˆ
µν . From Eq. (C1), Ωij can also
be expressed as a linear combination of the Mnm terms, that is,
Ωij =
∞∑
n,m=0
cnmMnm. (C2)
By properly choosing the coefficients cˆµν , one can ensure that cnm = 0 for some pairs (m,n) 6= (i, j). Note that the
coefficients cˆµν and cnm are selected independently for each bound M
U
ij that we want to obtain, but we have omitted
their dependency on (i, j) for simplicity. Then, we rewrite the R.H.S. of Eq. (C2) as
Ωij = cijMij +
∑
(n,m)∈S+
cnmMnm +
∑
(n,m)∈S−
cnmMnm, (C3)
where we have defined S+ (S−) as the set of pairs (n,m) 6= (i, j) such that cnm is a positive (negative) number. In
our choice of Ωij , we have ensured that cij is positive. From Eq. (C3), one can obtain the following upper bound on
Mij
Mij =
1
cij
Ωij − ∑
nm∈S+
cnmMnm −
∑
nm∈S−
cnmMnm

≤ 1
cij
UB{Ωij} − LB{ ∑
(n,m)∈S+
cnmMnm}+ UB{
∑
(n,m)∈S−
|cnm|Mnm}
 , (C4)
where UB{x} (LB{x}) denotes an upper (lower) bound on x.
Now, we find an expression for each of the bounds within Eq. (C4). First, note that Ωij is a linear combination of the
expected values E[Mµν ]. While these are unknown to the users, they can obtain lower and upper bounds EL[Mµν ] and
EU [Mµν ] using the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound presented in Supplementary Note F. To obtain UB{Ωij},
we simply replace E[Mµν ] by either its upper or lower bound, depending on whether its coefficient in Ωij is positive
or negative.
Second, we use the fact that Mnm ≥ 0 to find the trivial lower bound LB{
∑
(n,m)∈S+ cnmMnm} = 0. For the
remaining term, we note that∑
n,m∈S−
|cnm|Mnm ≤ cmax
∑
n,m∈S−
Mnm
≤ cmax(Mz −Mij − LB{
∑
n,m/∈S−
(n,m) 6=(i,j)
Mnm}), (C5)
where we have chosen cmax such that cmax ≥ |cnm| for all the pairs (n,m) ∈ S−, and the last lower bound depends on
the particular Mij that we are trying to estimate, as we will show later. Substituting the three bounds in Eq. (C4)
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and isolating Mij , we obtain
Mij ≤ 1
cij + cmax
UB{Ωij}+ cmax(Mz − LB{ ∑
n,m/∈S−
(n,m)6=(i,j)
Mnm})
 . (C6)
1. Three-decoy bounds
Now, we obtain explicit lower bounds for the case in which Scut = 4 and each of Alice and Bob use three different
intensity settings, satisfying µ0 > µ1 > µ2 and ν0 > ν1 > ν2, respectively. For this, we take inspiration from the
asymptotic analytical bounds derived in [40]. First, we define
KaS ,aI ,bS ,bIij = κ
aI
A κ
bI
B Mˆ
aS ,bS − κaSA κbIB MˆaI ,bS − κaIA κbSB MˆaS ,bI + κaSA κbSB MˆaI ,bI , (C7)
which is a function of some intensities that satisfy aS > aI and bS > bI , with aS , aI ∈ {µ0, µ1, µ2} and bS , bI ∈
{ν0, ν1, ν2}. The coefficients κµA and κνB depend on the specific Mij that is to be estimated, but we have omitted this
dependence from the notation for simplicity. Using the previous equation, we now define
Ωij = w
µ1µ2
A w
ν1ν2
B K
µ0,µ1,ν0,ν1
ij − wµ0µ1A wν1ν2B Kµ1,µ2,ν0,ν1ij
− wµ1µ2A wν0ν1B Kµ0,µ1,ν1,ν2ij + wµ0µ1A wν0ν1B Kµ1,µ2,ν1,ν2ij , (C8)
where the coefficients wµνA and w
µν
B also depend on the particular Mij that we want to estimate. If we rewrite
Ωij as Ωij =
∑2
k,l=0 cˆµkνlMˆ
µkνl , it is easy to prove that if the coefficients wµνA , w
µν
B , κ
µ
A and κ
µ
B are all positive,
the coefficients cˆµkνl are always positive (negative) when k + l is even (odd). Thus, one can find upper (Ω
U
ij) and
lower (ΩLij) bounds on Ωij by properly replacing each Mˆµkνl by either its upper or lower bound, as explained in the
introduction of this Note.
a. Upper bound on M00
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = µ and w
µν
A = w
µν
B = (µ
2ν − ν2µ), we obtain a function Ω00 that can be rewritten as
Ω00 = c00M00 +
∞∑
n=3
cn0Mn0 +
∞∑
m=3
c0mM0m +
∞∑
n=3
m=3
cnmMnm, (C9)
where the coefficients
cnm =
1
m!n!pnm
µ1ν1 [µ0µ1 (µ0 − µ1)µn2 − µ0µ2 (µ0 − µ2)µn1 + µ1µ2 (µ1 − µ2)µn0 ]
× [ν0ν1 (ν0 − ν1) νm2 − ν0ν2 (ν0 − ν2) νm1 + ν1ν2 (ν1 − ν2) νm0 ] , (C10)
can be shown to be non-negative for all n,m [40]. Then, an upper bound on M00 is straightforwardly given by
M00 ≤ Ω
U
00
c00
, (C11)
where we have lower bounded the term
∑∞
n=3 cn0Mn0 +
∑∞
m=3 c0mM0m +
∑∞
n=3
m=3
cnmMnm by zero since all the
coefficients satisfy cnm ≥ 0.
b. Upper bound on M11
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = 1 and w
µν
A = w
µν
B = (µ
2 − ν2), we obtain a function Ω11 that can be rewritten as
Ω11 = c11M11 +
∞∑
n=3
cn1Mn1 +
∞∑
m=3
c1mM1m +
∞∑
n=3
m=3
cnmMnm, (C12)
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where the coefficients
cnm =
[
µn0
(
µ21 − µ22
)− µn1 (µ20 − µ22)+ µn2 (µ20 − µ21)] [νm0 (ν21 − ν22)− νm1 (ν20 − ν22)+ νm2 (ν20 − ν21)]
m!n!pnpm
, (C13)
can be shown to be negative for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S−, with S− = {(n,m)|n ≥ 3,m = 1} ∪ {(n,m)|n = 1,m ≥ 3}
and non-negative for the paris (n,m) ∈ S+, with S+ = {(n,m)|n ≥ 3,m ≥ 3} [40]. According to Eq. (C5), an upper
bound on the sum of negative terms can be obtained by∑
n,m∈S−
|cnm|Mnm ≤ cmax(Mz −M11 − LB{
∑
n,m/∈S−
(n,m)6=(1,1)
Mnm})
≤ cmax(Mz −M11 − LB{
∑
n,m∈So
Mnm})
≤ cmax(Mz −M11 − LB{
∞∑
n=1
Mn0}+ LB{
∞∑
m=1
M0m} −UB{M00}), (C14)
where cmax ≥ |cnm| for all the pairs (n,m) ∈ S− and So = {(n, 0)|n ≥ 0} ∪ {(0,m)|m ≥ 0}. In Eq. (C14), the second
inequality comes from the fact that we have set to zero all those terms Mnm, with (m,n) 6= (1, 1), which do not belong
to S− nor to So because Mnm ≥ 0, ∀n,m. A valid cmax can be obtained by noticing that, for n > s,
gµ(n) :=
µn0 (µ
s
1 − µs2)− µn1 (µs0 − µs2) + µn2 (µs0 − µs1)
n!pn
≤ µ
n
0 (µ
s
1 − µs2)
n!pn
≤ (µ
s
1 − µs2)
e−µ0pµ0
. (C15)
This means that, from Eqs. (C13) and (C15), cmax is given by
cmax = max[
(
µ21 − µ22
)
e−µ0pµ0
|gν(1)|,
(
ν21 − ν22
)
e−ν0pν0
|gµ(1)|]. (C16)
Finally from Eqs. (C4) and (C14), an upper bound on M11 is given by
M11 ≤MU11 =
ΩU11 + cmax(Mz −ML0A −ML0B +MU00)
c11 + cmax
, (C17)
where ML0A and M
L
0B are lower bounds on the quantities M0A =
∑∞
m=0M0m and M0B =
∑∞
n=0Mn0, respectively,
and we have lower bounded the term
∑∞
n,m=3 cnmMnm by zero. Since M0A and M0B depend only on a single emitter,
we can estimate them using the same method as for the vacuum component in BB84. Using the results of [42], we
have that
ML0A = p0
µ1LB{Mˆµ2} − µ2UB{Mˆµ1}
µ1 − µ2 , (C18)
ML0B = p0
ν1LB{Mˆν2} − ν2UB{Mˆν1}
ν1 − ν2 , (C19)
where Mˆµ = eµ E[M
µ]
pµ
, Mˆν = eν E[M
ν ]
pν
, Mµ =
∑
νM
µν and Mν =
∑
µM
µν , with µ ∈ {µ0, µ1, µ2} and ν ∈ {ν0, ν1, ν2};
and the upper and lower bounds included in Eqs. (C18) and (C19) are obtained accordingly to Eq. (F1).
c. Upper bound on M22
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = 1 and w
µν
A = w
µν
B = (µ− ν), we obtain a function Ω22 that can be rewritten as
Ω22 =
∞∑
n,m=2
cnmMnm, (C20)
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where the coefficients
cnm =
[µn0 (µ1 − µ2)− µn1 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2 (µ0 − µ1)] [νm0 (ν1 − ν2)− νm1 (ν0 − ν2) + νm2 (ν0 − ν1)]
m!n!pnpm
, (C21)
can be shown to be non-negative for all the pairs (n,m) [40]. Then, an upper bound on M22 is straightforwardly
given by
M22 ≤MU22 =
ΩU22
c22
, (C22)
where we have lower bounded the term
∑∞
n,m≥2
n,m 6=2
cnmMnm by zero.
d. Upper bounds on M02 and M04
By substituting κµA = µ, κ
µ
B = 1, w
µ0µ1
A = (µ0 − µ1)µ0, wµ1µ2A = (µ1 − µ2)µ2 and wµνB = (µ − ν), we obtain a
function Ω02 that can be rewritten as
Ω02 =
∞∑
m=2
c0mM0m +
∞∑
n=3
m=2
cnmMnm, (C23)
where the coefficients
cnm =
[µn0µ1µ2 (µ1 − µ2)− µn1µ0µ2 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2µ0µ1 (µ0 − µ1)] [νm0 (ν1 − ν2)− νm1 (ν0 − ν2) + νm2 (ν0 − ν1)]
m!n!pnpm
,
(C24)
can be shown to be non-negative for all pairs (n,m) [40]. Then, an upper bound on M02 is straightforwardly given by
M02 ≤MU02 =
ΩU02
c02
, (C25)
where we have lower bounded all the terms cnmMnm in Eq. (C23), with the exception of c02M02, by zero. Similarly,
an upper bound on M04 is directly given by
M04 ≤MU04 =
ΩU02
c04
. (C26)
e. Upper bounds on M20 and M40
By substituting κµA = 1, κ
µ
B = µ, w
µν
A = (µ− ν), wν0ν1B = (ν0 − ν1)ν0 and wν1ν2B = (ν1 − ν2)ν2, we obtain a function
Ω02 that can be rewritten as
Ω20 =
∞∑
n=2
cn0Mn0 +
∞∑
n=2
m=3
cnmMnm, (C27)
where the coefficients
cnm =
[µn0 (µ1 − µ2)− µn1 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2 (µ0 − µ1)] [νm0 ν1ν2 (ν1 − ν2)− νm1 ν0ν2 (ν0 − ν2) + νm2 ν0ν1 (ν0 − ν1)]
m!n!pnpm
,
(C28)
can be shown to be non-negative for all the pairs (n,m) [40]. Then, an upper bound on M20 is straightforwardly
given by
M20 ≤MU20 =
ΩU20
c20
. (C29)
where we have lower bounded all the terms cnmMnm in Eq. (C27), with the exception of c20M20, by zero. Similarly,
an upper bound on M40 is directly given by
M40 ≤MU40 =
ΩU20
c40
. (C30)
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f. Upper bound on M13
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = 1, w
µν
A = (µ
2 − ν2) and wµνB = (µ− ν), we obtain a function Ω13 such that
− Ω13 =
∞∑
m=2
c1mM1m +
∞∑
n=3
m=2
cnmMnm, (C31)
where the coefficients
cnm = −
[
µn0
(
µ21 − µ22
)− µn1 (µ20 − µ22)+ µn2 (µ20 − µ21)] [νm0 (ν1 − ν2)− νm1 (ν0 − ν2) + νm2 (ν0 − ν1)]
m!n!pnm
, (C32)
can be shown to be positive for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S+, being S+ = {(n,m)|n = 1,m ≥ 2} and negative for the pairs
(n,m) ∈ S−, being S− = {(n,m)|n ≥ 3,m ≥ 2} [40]. Then, by following a similar procedure to that used to derive
Eq. (C17), an upper bound on M13 can be obtained as
M13 ≤MU13 =
cmax(Mz −ML0A −ML0B +MU00)− ΩL13
c13 + cmax
, (C33)
where cmax =
(ν1−ν2)
e−ν0pν0
(µ21−µ22)
e−µ0pµ0
, and ML0A and M
L
0B are given by Eqs. (C18) and (C19), respectively.
g. Upper bound on M31
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = 1, w
µν
A = (µ− ν) and wµνB = (µ2 − ν2), we obtain a function Ω31 such that
− Ω31 =
∞∑
n=2
cn1Mn1 +
∞∑
n=2
m=3
cnmMnm, (C34)
where the coefficients
cnm = −
[µn0 (µ1 − µ2)− µn1 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2 (µ0 − µ1)]
[
νm0
(
ν21 − ν22
)− νm1 (ν20 − ν22)+ νm2 (ν20 − ν21)]
m!n!pnm
, (C35)
can be shown to be positive for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S+, with S+ = {(n,m)|n ≥ 2,m = 1} and negative for the pairs
(n,m) ∈ S−, with S− = {(n,m)|n ≥ 2,m ≥ 3} [40]. Then, by following a similar procedure to that used to derive
Eq. (C17), an upper bound on M31 can be obtained as
M31 ≤MU31 =
cmax(Mz −ML0A −ML0B +MU00)− ΩL31
c31 + cmax
, (C36)
where cmax =
(µ1−µ2)
e−µ0pµ0
(ν21−ν22)
e−ν0pν0
, and ML0A and M
L
0B are given by Eqs. (C18) and (C19), respectively.
Supplementary Note D: Channel model
For our simulations, we use the channel model of [24], which we summarize here. We model the overall loss between
Alice (Bob) and Charlie by a beamsplitter of transmittance
√
η, which includes the channel transmissivity and the
quantum efficiency of Charlie’s detectors. We consider that the quantum channels connecting Alice and Bob with
Charlie introduce both phase and polarisation misalignments. We model the phase mismatch between Alice and Bob’s
pulses by shifting Bob’s signals by an angle φ = δphpi. We model polarisation misalignment as a unitary operation
that transforms Alice’s (Bob’s) polarisation input mode a†in (b
†
in) into the orthogonal polarisation output modes a
†
out
and a†out⊥ (b
†
out and b
†
out⊥) as follows: a
†
in → cos(θA)a†out − sin(θA)a†out⊥ (b†in → cos(θB)b†out − sin(θB)b†out⊥). The
rotation angles are assumed to be θA = −θB = arcsin
(√
δpol
)
.
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With this channel model, it can be shown [24] that the probability that Charlie reports a detection, given that both
users employ the X basis, is given by
QX = (1− pd)(e−γΩ(φ,θ) + eγΩ(φ,θ))e−γ − 2(1− pd)e−2γ , (D1)
where γ =
√
ηα2, θ = θA − θB , and Ω(φ, θ) = cosφ cos θ. The probability that Alice and Bob end up with different
key bits is given by
eX =
e−γΩ(φ,θ) − (1− pd)e−γ
e−γΩ(φ,θ) + eγΩ(φ,θ) − 2(1− pd)e−γ , (D2)
while the probability that Charlie reports a detection, given that both users employ the Z basis and select the
intensities µ and ν, respectively, is
Qµν = 2(1− pd)
[
e−
(µ2+ν2)
√
η
2 I0(µν
√
η cos θ)− (1− pd)e−(µ2+ν2)
√
η
]
, (D3)
where I0(z) =
1
2pii
∮
e(z/2)(t+1/t)t−1dt is the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
In our simulations, we assume that the observed measurement counts equal their expected value, that is, we set
MX = Np
2
XQX and M
µν = Np2ZpµpνQ
µν , where Mµν denotes the number of successful rounds in which Alice and
Bob select the Z basis and the intensities µ and ν, respectively. Also, we assume that the bit-error rate of the
sifted-key equals the probability given by Eq. (D2).
Supplementary Note E: Proof of Equation (13)
Let us consider the evolution that the initial quantum state |Φ〉 = |φ〉⊗N , where |φ〉 = |ψ〉AcAa ⊗ |ψ〉BcBb and|ψ〉 is given by Eq. (11), experiences before step (4.1) in Box 3, by taking into account all operations applied to it.
After Eve’s measurement in step 2 of Box 3, it is transformed to Mˆeve |Φ〉, where Mˆeve is the operator associated
with her outcome. Let us reorder |Φ〉 as |Φ〉 = |φ〉⊗M |φ〉⊗M¯ , writing first (last) the M (M¯) successful (unsuccessful)
rounds. In the virtual sifting step, Alice and Bob measure all subsystems Ac and Bc, using measurement operators
{Oˆs = |00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|, Oˆd = I − Oˆs}. Again, let us reorder |Φ〉 = |φ〉⊗Ms |φ〉⊗Md |φ〉⊗M¯s |φ〉⊗M¯d , writing first
(second) the Ms (Md) successful rounds in which the users used the same (a different) basis, and third (fourth) the
M¯s (M¯d) unsuccessful rounds in which the users used the same (a different) basis. The unnormalised quantum state
just before step 4.1 is then given by
Oˆ⊗Mss Oˆ
⊗Md
d Oˆ
⊗M¯s
s Oˆ
⊗M¯d
d Mˆeve |Φ〉 = MˆeveOˆ⊗Mss Oˆ⊗Mdd Oˆ⊗M¯ss Oˆ⊗M¯dd |Φ〉
= Mˆeve(Oˆs |φ〉)⊗Ms(Oˆd |φ〉)⊗Md(Oˆs |φ〉)⊗M¯s(Oˆd |φ〉)⊗M¯d ,
(E1)
where we have used the fact that Mˆeve commutes with the sifting operators, as they act on different systems. Next, in
step 4.1, Alice and Bob measure the registers Ac, Bc, A and B for all rounds in Ms, one by one. Let u ∈ {1, ...,Ms}
index the rounds in Ms, let ξu be the outcome of the measurement of the u-th registers, and let Mˆu denote its
associated measurement operator. Note that MˆuOˆs = Mˆu. The unnormalised state just before their measurement of
the u-th registers is
|Φu〉 = Mˆeve(⊗u−1l=1 Mˆl |φ〉)(Oˆs |φu〉)(Oˆs |φ〉)⊗(Ms−u)(Oˆd |φ〉)⊗Md(Oˆs |φ〉)⊗M¯s(Oˆd |φ〉)⊗M¯d , (E2)
where we have highlighted the initial quantum state of the u-th round, renaming it as |φu〉. Since we are interested
in the reduced state of the round u, we trace out the other rounds, which we denote by u¯:
σˆu = Tru¯[|Φu〉〈Φu|] =
∑
~¯u
〈
~¯u
∣∣Φu〉〈Φu∣∣~¯u〉 = ∑
~¯u
Mˆ~¯uOˆs |φu〉〈φu| Oˆ†sMˆ†~¯u, (E3)
where
Mˆ~¯u =
〈
~¯u
∣∣ Mˆeve(⊗u−1l=1 Mˆl |φ〉)(Oˆs |φ〉)⊗(Ms−u)(Oˆd |φ〉)⊗Md(Oˆs |φ〉)⊗M¯s(Oˆd |φ〉)⊗M¯d , (E4)
and the states {∣∣~¯u〉} represent a basis for all the subsystems Ac, A, Bc, B, a and b of all the rounds in the protocol
except the u-th round in Ms . The operator σˆu is unnormalised, and its trace denotes the joint probability of all
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previous measurement outcomes in the protocol. This includes Eve’s measurement outcomes and Alice and Bob
virtual sifting results, which we collectively denote as the event ξ; as well as Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes
ξ1, ..., ξu−1 of the previous u − 1 registers. That is, Tr[σˆu] = Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1). The probability that Alice and Bob
learn that they used the Z basis and sent Fock states |n,m〉 in the u-th round ofMs, conditioned on all the previous
events, is
Pr (ξu = Znm|ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1) =
Tr
[〈11|AcBc 〈nm|AB σˆu |11〉AcBc |nm〉AB]
Tr[σˆu]
=
Tr
[
〈11|AcBc 〈nm|AB
∑
~¯u Mˆ~¯u |φu〉〈φu| Mˆ†~¯u |11〉AcBc |nm〉AB
]
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
=
∑
~¯u
∥∥∥Mˆ~¯u 〈11|AcBc 〈nm|AB |φu〉∥∥∥2
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
=
p2Zpnm|Z
∑
~¯u
∥∥∥Mˆ~¯u |n〉a |m〉b∥∥∥2
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
=
p2Zpnm|Z 〈n|a 〈m|b
(∑
~¯u Mˆ
†
~¯u
Mˆ~¯u
)
|n〉a |m〉b
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
,
(E5)
where in the second equality we have used OˆsMˆ~¯u = Mˆ~¯uOˆs and Oˆs |00〉AcBc = |00〉AcBc . Now, let Eˆu =
∑
~¯u Mˆ
†
~¯u
Mˆ~¯u.
Since Eˆu is a sum of positive semi-definite operators, it is positive semi-definite. Therefore, we can decompose it as
Eˆu =
√
Eˆu
√
Eˆu, and rewrite Eq. (E5) as
Pr (ξu = Znm|ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1) =
p2Zpnm|Z 〈n|a 〈m|b
√
Eˆu
√
Eˆu |n〉a |m〉b
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
=
p2Zpnm|Z
∥∥∥√Eˆu |n〉a |m〉b∥∥∥2
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
.
(E6)
Using an identical approach, we can show that the probability that Alice and Bob will learn that they used the X
basis and sent cat states |CiCj〉 in the u-th successful round is
Pr (ξu = Xij |ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1) =
p2X
∥∥∥√Eˆu |Ci〉a |Cj〉b∥∥∥2
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
. (E7)
Now, we want to relate the probability terms on the left hand side of Eqs. (E6) and (E7). For this, we use the
approach of [24] and apply the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to show that
∥∥∥∥√Eˆu |Ci〉a |Cj〉b∥∥∥∥2 = ∑
n,n′∈Ni
m,m′∈Nj
√
pn′m′|X
√
pnm|X 〈n′|a 〈m′|b
√
Eˆu
√
Eˆu |n〉 |m〉
≤
∑
n,n′∈Ni
m,m′∈Nj
√
pn′m′|X
√
pnm|X
∥∥∥∥√Eˆu |n′〉a |m′〉b∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥√Eˆu |n〉a |m〉b∥∥∥∥
=
 ∑
n∈Ni,m∈Nj
√
pnm|X
∥∥∥∥√Eˆu |n〉a |m〉b∥∥∥∥
2 .
(E8)
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Combining the three previous equations, we obtain
P (ξu = Xij |ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1) ≤
p2X
[∑
n∈Ni,m∈Nj
√
pnm|X
∥∥∥√Eˆu |n〉a |m〉b∥∥∥]2
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
=
p2X
p2Z
[ ∑
n∈Ni,m∈Nj
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
Pr (ξu = Znm|ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
]2
,
(E9)
and since a phase error occurs when ξu ∈ {X00, X11}, its probability is upper-bounded by
Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|ξ, ξ0, ..., ξu−1) ≤ p
2
X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
Pr (ξu = Znm|ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
]2
. (E10)
Note that, since all probabilities are conditioned on ξ, we can remove it from the conditions and work on the probability
space in which the event ξ has happened. Also, to match the notation in Supplementary Note A, we rewrite Eq. (E10)
as
Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|Fu−1) ≤ p
2
X
p2Z
1∑
j=0
[ ∑
n,m∈Nj
√
pnm|X
pnm|Z
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1)
]2
, (E11)
where Fu−1 is the σ-algebra generated by ξ1, ..., ξu−1.
Supplementary Note F: Inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound
Here, we state the result that we use to obtain the lower and upper bounds required in Eq. (27). Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi
be the outcome of a sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the observation of the
outcome χ, its expectation value E[χ] can be lower and upper bounded by [48]
EL[χ] =
χ
1 + δL
,
EU[χ] =
χ
1− δU ,
(F1)
except with a probability εc, where δ
L and δU are the solutions of the following equations[
eδ
L
(1 + δL)1+δL
]χ/(1+δL)
=
1
2
εc
[
e−δ
U
(1− δU)1−δU
]χ/(1−δU)
=
1
2
εc.
(F2)
The solutions to Eq. (F2) satisfy [52]
1
1 + δL
= W0(−eln(εc/2−χ)/χ),
1
1− δU = W−1(−e
ln(εc/2−χ)/χ),
(F3)
where W0 and W−1 are branches of the Lambert W function, which is the inverse of the function f(z) = zez.
